The economic· history of Maritime Canada in the twentieth century has been largely one of dependence, both on powerful economic interests based outside the region and on the federal government. 2 Although the region's political and business leaders have, on occasion, acted together to win political concessions from Ottawa 3 -and thereby shape the terms of dependence -Maritime provincial governments have been viewed generally as powerless in dealing with dominant corporate interests, especially in the age of the multinational corporation. 4 Scholars have also viewed the post-1945 period as one during which Atlantic Canada became increasingly dependent on federal and provincial regional development programs which subsidised uneconomic ventures that did little to improve the long-term prospects of the economy. 5 New Brunswick's management of its new base metal industry during the · 1960s provides important qualifications to these views and to the standard interpretation in Canadian political economy of growing American control of Canadian natural resources during the post-war era. 6 It shows how, under certain circumstances during the era of state planning, the government of a 'have-not' province could exercise its powers against large-scale foreign and domestic investors to shape, in a limited way, the development of a new staple. Moreover, this state planning and intervention was directed at an industry with considerable potential for long-term economic benefit; unlike some of the more notorious provincially sponsored development fiascos in the region, such as the Bricklin sports car venture in the 1970s, mineral development was based on an existing natural resource for which there was market demand and which presented the real possibility of economic diversification and spinoffs. The case study also suggests that local investment is not always the panacea to economic development in a have-not region. Indeed, in instances where a provincial government relies on one local investor only . . :. . . especially one that already dominates the local economy -the result can be even greater dependency.
State economic planning in New Brunswick evolved slowly during the post-war period.7 R.A. Young has argued that the province squandered an excellent opportunity for economic renewal during the 1940s when it chose not to invest post-war treasury surpluses in a comprehensive development program recommended by the province's Reconstruction Commission. Unwilling to alienate established elites within the province who might feel threatened by such a program, the provincial Liberal government of John McNair opted instead to spend its windfall on infrastructure projects that fostered traditional patron-client networks through patronage. Although significant aspects of Young's thesis have been effectively challenged -in particular, his understanding of clientelism in New Brunswick -it is clear that the McNair government had little interest in development policy. 8 Economic plan-ning was a higher priority for the Progressive Conservative administration of Hugh John Flemming during the 1950s. It both expanded the provincial civil service and pursued a 'power for industry' development program designed to attract heavy industry through cheap power. This strategy, however, was ultimately compromised, Young argues, by the fact that the New Brunswick Electric Power Corporation officials who conceived it placed the utility's expansionary goals ahead of the wider public interest. 9 The growth of social and economic planning under the Robichaud Liberals during the 1960s, evident in such statecentred initiatives as Equal Opportunity and the federal Northeast Plan, has been widely noted. 10 Yet little is known about how this interest was reflected in dealings with private capital in a particular economic sector. A detailed examination of the province's management of mineral development reveals that the bonusing of large corporations, implicit in the Flemming government's 'power for industry' strategy, remained central to the Liberal government's program. Under Robichaud, howagrees with Young's implicit contention that forest capital as a whole was content with the continuing influence of existing patron-client networks. While traditional forest elites (the lumber barons) clearly saw benefits in these networks that they helped shape, multinational pulp and paper corporations -with which sawmillers competed for resources -sought a more powerful and professional civil service that would diminish the impact of clientelism and provide long-term corporate stability. Parenteau also objects to Young's belief that clientele networks 'inhibit class consciousness,' arguing instead that ' ever, the bonusing process became more formalized and subject to the oversight of a growing bureaucracy that demanded industry accountability. These factors, widespread local discontent with corporate resource exploitation, and the premier's own populist approach to politics all led the province gradually to play a more interventionist role in the development of provincial resources. New Brunswick's mining industry was virtually non-existent until January 1953, when Toronto prospector and developer M.J. (Jim) Boylen announced a major discovery of base metals in the Bathurst-Newcastle region." This discovery touched· off a claim-staking frenzy previously unseen in Canada. 12 American-based multinationals were drawn to the province both by the size of Boylen's ore body and by a strong international base metal market fuelled by the American government's stockpiling of strategic resources during the early years of the Cold War. 1 3 The most promising of the province's ore fields was controlled by Boylen through his flagship company, Brunswick Mining and Smelting Ltd. Brunswick's rich lead-zinc deposits near Bathurst, estimated to be second only to those of Noranda and International Nickel in terms of Canadian ore reserves, were the focus of much of the base metal fever of the early r95os.' 4 Soon after revealing his discovery, Boylen sold controlling interest in Brunswick to the American mining giant St n On New Brunswick's management of the base metal industry, see Kenny '"We must speculate'"; James L. Joseph Lead in order to generate development capital and gain access to the latest mining technology. Boylen, however, remained minority shareholder and president of the company as well as its biggest booster.
During the 1950s the province's mineral development policy was that of a passive rentier state.'5 Lured by the mining industry's promise of a base metal smelter employing thousands in the poverty-stricken northeast region of the province, the Flemming administration was willing to forgo economic rents and to meet corporate requests for infrastructure support. The new investors were offered generous tax concessions, favourable mining legislation, new roads, and, perhaps most importantly, the promise of inexpensive electricity through publicly funded hydroelectric development. But these were not enough to keep the American-controlled mining companies active when the base metal market began to decline in the mid-195os -due, in large part, to Washington's decision to curtail its stockpiling oflead and zinc -and the United States imposed a quota on lead-zinc imports in 1958. That same year American multinationals operating in New Brunswick suspended development operations. These shutdowns created much disappointment on the north shore, where great expectations of prosperity and jobs had been created by provincial politicians and mining promoters. Frustrations were exacerbated when it became widely known that Brunswick's principal investor, St Joseph Lead, had been instrumental in convincing Washington to impose the 1958 quota on lead-zinc imports and was now lobbying for even higher tariffs to protect its American operations. Local politicians and business leaders called on the provincial government to take action against the 'foreign' mining interests and to force development of 'the people's resources.' However, constrained by the ideological climate of the Cold War era, the province's lack of a history of state intervention, and its perceived dependence on the capital and technological expertise of large mining corporations, the Flemming administration refused to challenge the development timetables of the mining industry. 16 The Liberal government of Louis Robichaud, elected in 1960, promised a more aggressive approach to resource management. An Acadian from Kent County, Robichaud was a flamboyant politician with 15 A passive rentier state is willing to concede to private corporations economic rents accruing from natural resources in exchange for development. a gift for oratory and· a strong populist streak that made him attractive to many rural New Brunswickers. In opposition he had railed against the actions of St Joseph Lead and Jim Boylen, whom he accused of getting rich off of New Brunswickers, and demanded that the government impose a royalty on the unmined ore reserves of those corporations unwilling to develop their Crown mineral leases. 17 Robichaud's attack against the Flemming administration's cautious approach to resource management intensified during the 1960 provincial election campaign. In the northeastern and central parts of the province, where there was considerable disaffection over the pace of not only mineral but forest development as well, the Liberals ran on a Crown lands development platform. The party promised 'full-scale use of Crown forests' and 'appropriate legal action' to provide for the development of 'our mineral resources in the interests of New Brunswickers.' 18 If these veiled threats and pronouncements in opposition worried many in the mining industry, the new premier's actions shortly after his election did little to ease their minds.
Immediately after being sworn in, the new Liberal government signalled its willingness to take a more interventionist approach to resource management. A stock fraud operation involving a few small companies that were overvaluing mining developments in southwestern New Brunswick -and about which the previous government had apparently done nothing -was shut down and charges laid. 19 Robichaud also stepped up his criticism of Brunswick Mining and Smelting and its president for the company's alliance with St Joseph Lead. In a July 1960 interview the new premier complained of the 'sellout' of New Brunswick's resources to the same 'American firm that has helped depress the Canadian base metals industry' and proclaimed, ' guarantee $20 million in bonds for East Coast Smelting, a company he promised to establish to smelt lead-zinc concentrates on the north shore. After consulting a number of metallurgical experts as to the feasibility of the project, the government agreed in March 1961 to back the new venture. 27 Robichaud, however, added an important contingency to the province's offer. Boylen was given forty-five days to . find investors to buy out St Joseph's 40 per cent interest in Brunswick. During the late 1950s St Joseph had spurned Boylen's request to buy their share of the company, but this time they relented, setting the asking price at $rn.5 million. 28 The province's unrelenting criticism and threats appear to have influenced St Joseph's acceptance of Boylen's offer to buy, an offer they had refused just two years earlier. 29 The premier had taken every opportunity to condemn the American multinational. As late as the spring of 1961 he complained of St Joseph's slow development of the province's minefields, claiming that the company was 'deceiving us with their ready excuses.' 30 Robichaud would later tell a political rally that his government had told mining representatives that it would return the deposits to 'the people' if mining companies were not in production within a year.3' In explaining why the corporation chose to sell its interest in Brunswick, a St Joseph spokesman pointed to 'the attitude of the Canadian government toward the development of natural resources by foreign companies.' 32 While the Diefenbaker government had a more nationalist orientation than the previous St Laurent administration, the spokesman was clearly also referring to the New Brunswick government, whose hostility towards the corporation was obvious.
Boylen It was an ecstatic Louis Robichaud who, in a provincewide television address, announced the agreement to develop northern New Brunswick's base metals. In exchange for the government's $20 million guarantee, Brunswick-East Coast promised to build a $so million industrial complex composed of a large concentrating . mill, a smelter, and a fertilizer plant that would use smelter by-products. Boasting that the development would 'put New Brunswick in the foreground of Canadian mining and processing,' the premier predicted the creation of '3000 steady industrial jobs' that would have a tremendous multiplier effect on the local economy. More important, the megaproject was to be located on the province's poverty-stricken north shore, 'a region where such a long-term project can mean the revitalizing of a once proud economic district that led the world in lumber and shipbuilding.' 34 The strategic location of the industrial complex in this traditionally Liberal region had political benefits, but it also appealed to the Liberal government's growing interest in economic planning. Throughout his television address, the premier spoke of the government's desire to oversee an 'ordered and well-planned development,' a 'controlled development.' He emphasized the government's 'most careful planning' for the project, which he demonstrated by listing the various experts who had been consulted. This confidence in state economic planning marked a departure from the Flemming government's passive approach to development and would be further demonstrated later in the decade by the government's Equal Opportunity program, a set oflegislative measures transferring responsibility for health, education, and social services to the province, ostensibly for the purpose of improving access to these services in poorer countie.s.3> The buyout of St Joseph's interest in Brunswick by Boylen's investors represented a victory for Robichaud. In opposition he had condemned the Flemming government's refusal to deal more forcefully with the American multinational and had proposed helping local entrepreneurs, such as Irving, get into the mining business.3 6 Now, as premier, he could boast that his government's threats to impose an export tax on unprocessed minerals had forced Brunswick to postpone its agreement with Sogemines and to begin development of a smelter within the province. It cannot be known whether Robichaud would have passed legislation to force St Joseph out of the province's mining industry -as he claimed he had been prepared to do -but by conditioning the government's guarantee of bonds on the removal of St Joseph from the project, the government made it clear to Jim Boylen that Brunswick's interests would be better served without the American company.3 7 The popular perception, particularly in northern New Brunswick, that St Joseph's interests differed from those of 'the people' gave the provincial government substantial leverage in this matter. The entry of Irving, a 'native son' whose interests at least seemed local, gave the enterprise political legitimacy. Robichaud was a populist who both recognized and exploited local concerns regarding foreign investment in the mineral industry. By getting Irving involved in the project he could claim that, in the hands of a local investor, New Brunswick's mine assets would be 'utilized and not left in the ground, and ... developed for the benefit of our province and its people.'3 8 Although his government was in no way committed to a domestic development strategy and accepted foreign investment as a fact of life in an underdeveloped province, Robichaud and others did believe that local investors were more inclined to operate in the local interest. Irving too understood, and probably believed, this assumption, and over the next five years would use it to strengthen his bargaining position with the province. Not everyone was so confident, though. Lord Beaverbrook, New Brunswick's chief benefactor throughout this period, warned Robichaud in 1961 of the dangers of placing too much control of the provincial economy in the hands of one industrialist.39 Having met Robichaud's demand to get St Joseph out of the operation, Brunswick was then in a strong bargaining position. Corporation lawyers negotiated a long list of incentives that were eventually incorporated into special legislation passed at the fall legislative session. The most important of these concessions was the provincial guarantee of $20 million in East Coast Smelting bonds. Although not common, guarantees backed by the provincial government had been made in the past through the New Brunswick Development Board, but never to the same extent as that now being offered to Brunswick-East Coast. The guarantee was contingent on smelter construction beginning before the end of 1963.
More controversial, however, was the granting of a special right to the company to enter tax agreements with municipalities for up to thirty years, a much longer period than normal. The municipalities of Northumberland and Gloucester both opposed this concession before the legislature's Corporations Committee, arguing that it put them in a weak bargaining position with Brunswick. 40 Entering into a long-term tax agreement before the operation was under way, and its future value unknown, meantthat the local government would see little tax revenue for a number of years. Since, at this time, municipalities were responsible for financing local education, health, and social services, this issue was of great significance to these counties where the tax base was already very small. The passage of the measure precipitated a protracted dispute between Brunswick, which demanded a thi. rty-year tax agreement at a fixed annual amount, and Gloucester County.41 County officials argued for a shorter term of two years, which would allow the contract to be renegotiated after an ongoing inquiry into municipal taxation was completed. 42 The popular belief among councillors, that Brunswick was trying to 'get in under the wire' by signing an agreement before the commission reported, intensified when Brunswick refused to begin construction of the industrial complex until a satisfactory tax agreement was signed. 43 This negotiating tactic met with success in short order as the council agreed to a thirty-year deal that provided for slightly more generous annual tax yields and a $so,ooo interest free 'goodwill' loan by the company. The council's decision was 40 1962 by no means unanimous; eight of the twenty councillors voted against the agreement and, on the day that the pact was to be signed, six councillors made an unsuccessful attempt to have the agreement delayed. 44 The government also offered Brunswick a series of environmental bonuses that raised the ire of provincial conservation groups. One of these concessions allowed the company to divert rivers and streams for its operations. The Miramichi Salmon Association opposed this measure, fearing that the bill would allow for 'uncontrolled tampering' that might adversely affect the salmon industry, and demanded more, not less, government control over the waterways. Premier Robichaud dismissed this objection, arguing that transferring the power to divert waterways from the government to Brunswick would result in 'little difference.' 45 A more controversial concession protected Brunswick and East Coast from 'nuisance' suits arising from pollution caused by their operations. Provincial fishing and conservation organizations vigorously opposed the concession, and with good reason. Just one year earlier the Miramichi Fish and Gun Club had used the courts to force Heath Steele Mines, the second largest 'mining interest in the region, to stop a leakage of lead-zinc tailings, which was killing salmon and jeopardizing the region's lucrative sport and commercial fishery, into the Northwest Miramichi River. 46 It is significant that the provincial government, desperate to get the mining industry started again, did not take the initiative against the mining company. The lack of provincial oversight had demonstrated to many fishers, both recreational and commercial, the value of being able to launch a private action against a polluting company. It oppose the no-nuisance clause. The salmon association's lawyer argued that 'if every company was to be exempt from injunction for stream pollution "you can say goodbye" to the salmon fishing industry.' He also expressed concern over the effects of air pollution on the province's forest industry, pointing to an ongoing study in Ontario suggesting a link between smelters and forest 'decimation.' Brunswick defended itself against these concerns by emphasizing Irving's connection to the local community. A native of Buctouche, Kent County, which bordered Northumberland County, Irving told the Corporations Committee that destroying the fishing industry 'would be the last thing he would do ... since that would be bad for the North Shore and he came from there.' While 'smelter smoke on some days might make it ·a little unpleasant,' he went on to say, his company would pay for any damage privately.47 Although the government also defended the no-nuisance clause, noting the disruptive effect of nuisance suits against mining companies in the United States, it eventually added an amendment allowing the attorney general to authorize a suit against the company. 48 Other aspects of the government's special legislation drew opposition from smaller New Brunswick mining interests. Of particular concern was a clause granting East Coast the exclusive right to smelt New Brunswick base metals for twenty-five years. Other companies could build smelters to process their own ore, but only Brunswick was permitted to smelt ore produced by other provincial mines. Since mining companies faced tax penalties if they exported unprocessed base metals, this clause gave East Coast a virtual smelting monopoly. The Corporations Committee heard protests from Brunswick's competitors and the New Brunswick Prospectors and Developers Association which worried that Brunswick's enormous advantage would scare away risk capital from other provincial mining interests. 49 Faced with this industry opposition, the government modified the offending clause to limit the exclusive smelting right to ten years and to require East Coast to offer its smelting services at a competitive rate. Smaller mmmg companies had more luck in opposing a provision permitting Brunswick to expropriate land, with compensation being· determined by a provincial Supreme Court judge. 50 The original wording of this clause appeared to give Brunswick the. right to expropriate minerals as well as land. Responding to protests from the Canadian Metal Mining Association, Brunswick officials claimed to have 'no knowledge' of this clause, suggesting that it 'must have been inserted by an overly zealous lawyer.' 51 The clause was eventually eliminated. · The legislative concessions were supplemented in 1962 by orders in council offering Brunswick further special treatment. The first transferred ownership of the 'mines and minerals held under lease' by Brunswick from the Crown -as specified in the province's Mining Act -to the company. While Brunswick had argued that this transfer would ensure stability and therefore attract investment, it also lessened the province's ability to intervene in the industry. The other two orders in council dealt with mining taxes. The province pledged that it would not increase mining taxes, as it was permitted to do under the Mining Tax Act, and that it would not impose the export tax on unprocessed minerals leaving the province. 52 The latter concession -obtained after much lobbying by Brunswick's owners -allowed the company to enter a new short-term export agreement with Sogemines.53 The deal gave Brunswick development capital, revenue from the sale of concentrates while the smelter was being constructed, and a guaranteed European market for twelve years, an important consideration at a time when protectionist sentiment was strong in the United States.
Although it is understandable that other mining companies opposed many of the province's concessions to Brunswick, the level of local opposition to this new enterprise is notable. Conservationists opposed the environmental bonuses, while municipal governments lobbied unsuccessfully against long-term tax agreements. Moreover, the provincial Prospectors and Developers Association, Gloucester County's Englishspeaking Federation of Agriculture, and the municipal governments of Bathurst and Gloucester County formed a united front opposing many of the concessions. The editor of the Bathurst Northern Light attributed the opposition to a widespread local belief that the promoters were trying to 'mine the people of New Brunswick.'5 4 The province politely recognized the protests, but ultimately believed that the incentives were an acceptable price for development. The larger goal of smelter development -which had tremendous political value throughout the province -soon overshadowed all others, allowing the government to overlook legitimate local concerns and to ignore its own 'principled' objections to the export of unprocessed raw materials. Initially portraying themselves as defenders of 'the people's resources,' the Robichaud administration was increasingly placed in a position where it had to legitimate corporate demands to sceptical local residents. New Brunswick's willingness to challenge a powerful mining interest, St Joseph Lead, was part of the government's broader populist approach to resource development. In 1962 the government took the unprecedented action of withdrawing Crown forest licences from existing pulp and paper corporations and giving them to an Italian firm that promised to build a pulp mill at South Nelson in Northumberland County. Both this action and the government's intervention in the mining industry can be seen as populist responses to longstanding local discontent with corporate exploitation of Crown resources in Gloucester and Northumberland counties. This discontent, which dated back to the 1930s, was fuelled by the failure of pulp and paper companies to use and develop local Crown lands that they held under longterm lease. 55 Traditional political and economic elites, based in the declining sawmilling sector, joined forces with the region's underemployed working class to demand that the government exercise its role as custodian of the 'people's resources' and force the offending companies to develop local Crown forest resources. These protests intensified during the late 1950s and informed local opposition to American mining companies, for the similarities between the slow development of the two resource industries were clear. Having grown up in Kent County, which bordered Northumberland County, Premier Robichaud was well positioned to understand local opposition to corporate resource exploitation. During the 1963 election campaign he told of how Robichaud also recognized that discontent with the multinational corporations was widespread throughout the region and articulated by local political elites, many of whom played key roles in the Liberal Party.57 His government's interventions in the forest and mineral industries thus suggest the continuing influence of patronage networks in shaping development policy. 58 These interventions were in no way radical, but they did signal the province's willingness to confront, in a limited way, the long-held corporate assumption that Crown resources could be developed according to corporate needs only. The agreement to finally develop the region's base metals was met with great enthusiasm. The Northern Miner, which had only the previous year denounced Robichaud, now hailed him as a man of vision and a friend of mining capital. 59 In northern New Brunswick, where unemployment remained high, the smelter complex represented tremendous hope. Liberal MI.A Claude Savoie predicted that the development would transform Gloucester County from the poorest to the richest county in New Brunswick. 60 New Brunswick's base metal industry looked quite healthy by 1963. In addition to Brunswick's rich ore fields, there were a number of smaller mines in the Bathurst region being readied for production. While the provincial government's interventions did help kickstart the industry, it was aided greatly by improving market conditions. Despite the American government's import quotas on lead and zinc -which would remain in effect until 1965 -the international base metal market was strong, buoyed by heavy demand from Western European countries and Japan, which were emerging from post-war reconstruction with strong industrial economies. 62 Mining interests in New Brunswick were able to take advantage of this new demand, which provided a welcome alternative to the increasingly restrictive American base metal markets. 6 3 The province cooperated by extending the export tax waiver, first granted to Brunswick, to other mining interests until the East Coast smelter was in operation. 64 By mid-decade Heath Steele Mines was producing lead-zinc concentrates destined for European, Mexican, and American smelters, while Consolidated Mining and Smelting's (coMrnco) mine near Bathurst was exporting copper concentrates to Japan. 65 Of course, the government viewed the export of unprocessed mineral resources as a short-term measure that would be overcome with the completion of Brunswick's processing complex. from the addition of fertilizer and acid plants -which would use byproducts and surplus gases produced by the smelting process -and an electric refinery that would process local deposits of iron pyrite into steel. Robichaud noted that the complex was easily the largest industrial project ever undertaken in New Brunswick, predicting that it would produce 29 million man hours of construction work and more than 1500 permanent jobs. Located in the poorest part of the province and processing local natural resources, the megaproject was touted as the ideal industrial development. While the government's desire to make political hay out of Brunswick's expansion is understandable, its interest in promoting a new steel plant -described by the premier as 'the heart and sinew of any industrial economy' 70 -at a time when Nova Scotia's steel industry was floundering is curious.7'
It is unclear whether the government or Brunswick initiated the idea of expanding the smelter complex, although Irving's ownership of Ocean Steel and Construction Ltd, created in 1960, attests to a preexisting interest in the steel industry. It is clear, however, that the project increased the bargaining position of Irving and Boylen with the province. By giving Robichaud the honour of announcing the project, they allowed him to associate his government with it and, thus, to reap political rewards. It also bound the province more closely to the success of the project. It would be hard for the premier to deny aid for this complex which, as Robichaud never tired of stating, was the product of Canadian and New Brunswick investment and ingenuity.
Irving and his co-investors must also have recognized that the construction of a large industrial complex in an impoverished part of rural New Brunswick would have an ongoing appeal to governments concerned increasingly with planned regional economic development. The 1960s saw a proliferation of provincial and federal agencies designed to rehabilitate and modernize 'have-not' regions through private investment and social readjustment.7 2 Northeastern New Brunswick, described by many as one of the country's worst examples of perpetual rural poverty, drew much of this attention. 73 Act (ARDA), outlined the. extent of the region's economic weakness; 74 out of a working population of 29,000, some ro,ooo were 'seriously underemployed and unemployed,' and the average per capita income was approximately $soo, one-half of the provincial average and onethird of the national standard. Moreover, 36 per cent of the local population had a grade four education or less (compared to 13 per cent nationally), and more than 60 per cent of the region's schools had only one or two rooms, where local people, many of whom had only a grade nine education, taught.7 5 Northeastern New Brunswick's weak economy, and the state's growing interest in redeveloping it, increased the strategic importance of Brunswick's planned industrial complex and opened new avenues of state support for the project's investors.
Nowhere is the state's reliance on the new industry better illustrated than in the case of the federal Fund for Regional Economic Development (FRED), signed in 1966, which targeted northeastern New Brunswick.76 Steeped heavily in the modernization ideology and assumptions that were so prevalent throughout the Western world during the 1950s and 1960s, the Northeast Plan was designed to encourage rural residents to abandon their 'traditional' way of life in favour of the 'modern' industrial world, represented in many ways by the proposed smelter complex.7 7 Residents were to be convinced to leave poorly paid seasonal iobs in underproductive resource sectors -such as the fishery -and, through education and retraining, become instilled with the skills that would allow them to participate in an economy dominated by technologically intensive industries. The Northeast Plan funded education and the relocation of rural residents to regional growth poles, but, interest- ingly, allotted no money for job creation.7 8 A central assumption of the plan was that private investment in the new mining and, to a lesser extent, pulp and paper industries would be the engine of economic growth. 79 Predicting that, over a five-year period, the mining industry alone would employ 1500 new workers and stimulate the creation of another 4500 jobs in the region, the plan's architects were concerned only with ensuring that the local population had the skills and industrial mindset to qualify for the new jobs. 80 The Northeast Plan would eventually provide the mining industry with a better-educated workforce, but it also revealed the government's dependence, a circumstance that strengthened greatly the bargaining position of Brunswick's managers. The mutual dependence of the government and Brunswick is evident in the events surrounding the decision to build the smelter complex and a state-subsidised harbour at Belledune Point in Gloucester County. Initially, the company's managers wanted to locate the project in Saint John in order to take advantage of the established yearround ice-free port, trained industrial workforce, and, presumably, the fact that it was the base of Irving's industrial empire. The premier, who had a strong political stake in having the smelter built on the north shore, opposed Brunswick, making the government's $20 million guarantee conditional on locating the project in northern New Brunswick.81 The company acceded to the premier's wishes without much of a fight, but would use this example of its 'goodwill' to win provincial concessions in the future. Robichaud supported the company's eventual choice of Belledune Point, on the Baie des Chaleurs, and, at Brunswick's insistence, helped convince Ottawa to contribute $9 million to the construction of a new year-round deep-water harbour to be used almost exclusively by Brunswick. Ottawa's decision to build Belledune harbour was very much informed by regional development concerns. In its initial request for aid the provincial government appealed to Ottawa's increasing interest in regional economic planning, noting that 'the construction of the harbour would make a very significant contribution to the rational development of the entire northern region of this province.' 87 Background memoranda prepared by federal officials emphasized the province's role in encouraging East Coast to locate on the north shore rather than in Saint John, tacitly accepting the legitimacy of this Brunswick used similar arguments in trying to win federal tax concessions. The Area Development Agency (ADA) offered three-year tax holidays to companies establishing manufacturing industries in designated areas of chronic high unemployment. Company officials thought that the choice of Belledune, in the traditionally poor county of Gloucester, as the site of its industrial complex put the company in a good position to take advantage of the ADA program. However, under the agency's quirky designation criteria, Gloucester County was excluded from the list of eligible regions in favour of the neighbouring region of Campbellton in Restigouche County.9° Brunswick again enlisted the Robichaud government, this time to help convince Ottawa to include its Belledune operation, located less than three miles from the Restigouche County border, as part of the Campbellton designated area. The province endorsed the application even though, under existing federal-provincial tax agreements, the federal tax concession amounted to a reduction in the amount of corporate tax revenue transferred to New Brunswick from Ottawa. Meanwhile, company managers assured federal officials that while their complex would 'initiate a startling transformation' in the whole north shore economy, Restigouche County would be the principal beneficiary, with the company's labour force being drawn mostly from the county. By mid-decade it was abundantly clear to Brunswick's managers that the smelter complex had immense political value. Not only did it represent tremendous political capital for the provincial government in northern New Brunswick -which traditionally voted Liberal -but it played an important role in the broader regional development goals of both federal and provincial planners. Indeed, the project was so important to the premier that control of it was centred in his office, while most other economic ventures were under the direction of the province's various development agencies. 94 Recognizing their leverage, Brunswick's investors asked the province for another financial guarantee, this time for $60 million worth of bonds issued by Bay Steel, the company set up to manage the steel plant.
While the politicians seemed vulnerable to Brunswick's latest overture, senior civil servants, many of whom were hired to design and implement the province's Equal Opportunity legislation, were more sceptical. Donald Tansley, the province's deputy minister of finance, was particularly concerned with the prospect of increasing the province's obligations to the company. Tansley, who had been a senior civil servant in Saskatchewan under Tommy Douglas's ccF government, was both a key adviser on Equal Opportunity and the architect of a complete modernization of the Department ·of Finance. He staffed his department with 'a vital body of economists and fiscal experts with a great faith in debt financing' and tried to create an interdepartmental 'machinery to protect the government ... from itself in involvement with industry.'9 5 This concern was surely present when Tansley cautioned the government about proceeding with Brunswick's latest request. In memoranda to his minister, LG. Desbrisay, and the premier, the deputy minister complained that government officials seemed willing to grant the guarantee without first undertaking studies of the project's feasibility and the impact of such a guarantee on the province's credit rating, particularly if the project failed. He warned; 'it would appear that we are going to risk about $rno for every man, woman, and child with no more detailed examination of the proposal than that accorded a minor budgetary matter.' Tansley's concerns were at least partially heeded; the Bay Steel Act, passed quickly and . with little debate in April 1965, stated that the 'government may guarantee company funds up to $so million.9 6 Tansley's suspicions about Brunswick's latest expansion were well founded. An ad hoc committee established to assess the project, composed of Tansley and representatives of the province's newly created Development Corporation and Research and Productivity Council, reported that Brunswick's lack of detailed plans made a feasibility study impossible. Questions would later be raised about the company's ability to raise capital funds over and above the money guaranteed by the province. But Tansley also recognized Robichaud's political stock in the project. In a covering letter to the committee's report he suggested to the premier that, if there were 'circumstances' which made the committee's negative recommendation 'impracticable or unrealistic,' the province should attach strict conditions on the guarantee. 97 The government did decide in August 1965 to offer a guarantee contract to Bay Steel, but insisted on tight controls over project expenditures and on the province, in the case of default, receiving all equity in the steel interest. Brunswick's owners were 95 Brunswick did have substantial financial problems, created in large part by the cost of smelter construction, which had ballooned from an original estimate of $20 million in 1962 to anywhere between $46 and $70 million in 1966, 102 These problems lead Irving to ask the premier in 1966 for an extension on the smelter completion date. However, faced with the recent failure of the South Nelson Forest Products pulp mill and an apparent financial embarrassment in a government-funded industrial park in Westmoreland, Robichaud refused to countenance any delays to his cherished mining megaproject.' 0 3 This rejection led Brunswick to make yet another request for financial aid. Acknowledging the company's financial problems for the first time, Boylen, in September 1966, asked the government to guarantee another $20 million in long-term East Coast bonds. 104 As negotiations progressed, Brunswick increased this request to include an additional government guarantee of $10 million in short-term notes.
Unwilling to see the project die, Robichaud and his cabinet colleagues, in October 1966, approved the request in principle; subject to a positive review by the province's new Guarantee Board.' 0 5 Composed of the finance minister and bureaucrats from the government's increasingly large planning arms, the board had serious reservations about the latest guarantee. Not only had Brunswick been unwilling to provide accurate financial and technical information to the government, but board members wondered if the 'present management [is] capable and can they be trusted with the future operations?' The owners were criticized for their reliance on government and their unwillingness to increase their own investment in the complex. Despite these concerns, the board faced mounting pressure to approve the guarantee when news of the company's financial problems -losses of nearly $10 million and a working capital deficit 'approaching $60 million' -became public in December 1966 and Brunswick stock tumbled from a high of $25 to between $4 and $5 per share.' 06 The board eventually approved the guarantee on the condition that the government have more oversight of the project through the appointment of representatives on the board of directors, spot-checks, and regular supervision by the New Brunswick Development Corporation.' 0 7
Many in government feared that, even with increased government oversight, this latest concession was a temporary solution and that the real problem lay in Irving's management of Brunswick. They were particularly concerned that Irving's Engineering Consultants, the company overseeing the construction of the industrial complex, had distributed most of the construction work to other Irving companies. The Guarantee Board noted that 'the major share of Brunswick's and East Coast's accounts payable are owing to companies controlled by Irving' and worried that it was he, rather than Brunswick-East Coast, who would be the principal beneficiary of provincial aid. It recommended that any government guarantee be conditional on the company calling tenders on 'all capital expenditures exceeding $25,000.' 108 Boylen, himself, would later attribute the smelter's cost overruns to Irving's selective contracting. Indeed, the scope of the industrialist's domination was immense. By the end of October 1966, East Coast owed $2.7 million to suppliers and more than $7 million to mostly Irving-owned companies. In addition to Engineering Consultants: Moreover, Engineering Consultants was also managing the construction of Belledune's public harbour, an arrangement that would yield even more profits for the Irving group." 0 In later years Robichaud would contend that Irving's goal was to allow the smelter project to go bankrupt and then try to buy it back at a fire-sale price. m
Irving had a very different explanation for the smelter's cost overruns. East Coast's financial problems, he would later argue, were attributable to Premier Robichaud's refusal to grant delays in the project in spite of critical technical problems with the smelter. In 1963 East Coast officials, on the advice of Irving's own engineering consultants, chose a relatively new technique -the British-designed Imperial smelter -to refine New Brunswick's mid-grade ore. This choice was apparently based on incorrect information, though, for the company sent the wrong samples for testing under the Imperial process. Moreover, the process, designed for zinc processing, had to be altered to accommodate lead. Consequently, modifications were constantly being made during the construction phase. These problems prompted Irving to ask for extensions in 1963 and again in 1966. It was Robichaud's refusal to grant a delay, Irving argued, rather than mismanagement, that was the source of the smelter's problems." 2 Irving's monopoly on contracts created friction on the north shore. A letter writer to the Bathurst Northern Light objected to Irving's control, noting that local contractors were hurt by the lack of tendering for construction jobs at the complex. Another complained of the 'lost benefits' to the region caused by Engineering Consultants' decision to buy equipment and supplies from Saint John rather than locally. The writer demanded that 'this cartel ... be broken up to permit normal competitive principles of business apply.' 113 There were other signs of growing local dissatisfaction with Irving's management. Already worried that the ADA's inclusion of Belledune within the Campbellton designated area would direct most of the benefits of development to Restigouche County, Bathurst residents were upset to learn in 1965 that Irving planned to build a large town site at Belledune. A federal report noted that Bathurst citizens felt they had been 'sold down the river' by the industrialist 'who had previously indicated that Bathurst would participate in any local development.' 114 Rumours of the new town and the ongoing debate over municipal taxation sparked by the Robichaud government's Equal Opportunity initiatives resurrected concerns about Gloucester County's generous thirty-year tax agreements with Brunswick-East Coast. Some residents feared that because the agreements covered East Coast 'and associated companies,' the company could 'escape taxation' by registering equipment in Gloucester County and using it elsewhere. Others worried that East Coast could establish a 'company town' in which it rented houses to its employees, thereby depriving the county -which would still be responsible for the education of employees' children -of property tax revenue." 5 Similar concerns were raised by a group of more than one hundred ratepayers who travelled to Fredericton in October 1965 to protest the county's heavy tax burden and to demand the end of municipal concessions to private companies. 116 The premier was also experiencing political pressures from within his own party. A confidential report to the premier from a Liberal organizer protested that few locally owned trucks were being employed in the smelter construction. Instead, most ofthe work went to Irving trucks, many of which would travel from Saint John daily. Local truckers who did manage to get hired, the report claimed, were required to fill their vehicles at Irving gas stations and were paid $5 per hour to haul 'on a 2-way basis,' while Irving trucks 'load[ed] one way only.' The organizer complained especially that 'hard working Liberals ... were not being taken care of.' Traditional clientele understandings were challenged as the state subsidized private corporations more directly. Accustomed to access to jobs arising from provincially funded infrastructure projects, government party loyalists were disappointed to Oct. 1965 learn that these privileges were not extended to government-backed private developments. This state of affairs, the Liberal organizer warned, could have grave political consequences for Robichaud. 'While "business is business" these projects for which you, Sir, worked so hard, should be the source of good Public relations for our Party. Unfortunately, the reverse is the case.' 117 Ottawa, too, was having its problems with Irving. The National Harbours Board, which was to administer Belledune's new harbour, worried that Irving's insistence on having his operations 'in unbroken lines' would all but 'eliminate' public access to the harbour." 8 Irving eventually backed down after Ottawa agreed to cover a larger portion of harbour construction, but dealings between the two parties remained difficult. In 1966 Hedard Robichaud, the Gloucester County member of parliament and federal fisheries minister, complained to the premier of 'Irving's attitude,' noting that, 'if this project is to be a total federal government undertaking Mr. Irving will be unable to have any special vested interest in the harbour or its operation.'" 9
The personal relationship between Robichaud and Irving was also souring. The premier had crossed Irving initially in 1960 when his government encouraged the establishment of a new paper mill at Courtney Bay -operated by the Rothesay Paper Corporation -which competed directly with Irving's own paper interests. Over the next five years the industrialist became increasingly irritated with the government over its rejection of his bid to buy the financially troubled South Nelson Forest Products Ltd and its support of a fertilizer plant in Westmoreland County which would compete with Brunswick's planned fertilizer operation. 120 However, the biggest rift between the two men was created by the governm_ ent's Equal Opportunity legislation, part of which eliminated municipal tax concessions to private firms. Irving, who had benefited greatly from such concessions. over the years, feared that the proposed legislation would abolish existing agreements between his companies and municipal governments. In a muchpublicized twelve-hour appearance before the legislature's Law Amendments Committee in 1965, a furious K.C. Irving won a government commitment ensuring that existing agreements would not be rescinded. The confrontation embarrassed the government and symbolized the growing distance between Irving and Robichaud.' 21 The combination of these factors -bureaucratic distrust of Irving's management, local discontent, and the growing animosity between the industrialist and the premier -provided a compelling case for the government to find a way to remove the local tycoon from the province's most important industrial project. In early 1967 Robichaud initiated a secret search for a new investor to wrest control of Brunswick from Irving. Robichaud confidante Edward Byrne, author of the report that provided the blueprint for Equal Opportunity 122 and one of the government's new appointees on Brunswick's board of directors, was dispatched to discuss the matter with both Canadian and American mining firms. Many-such as Falconbridge Mines, COMINCO, and even St Joseph Lead -refused to get involved because of Brunswick's heavy debt load. Eventually, Byrne, with the help of Boylen and Erskine Carter of Patino, both of whom also wanted to see Irving out of the project, convinced Noranda to take over the project. 123 Noranda agreed to pay off $so million in Brunswick debts and to loan $20 million to complete the smelter, in return for 51 per cent control of the company.
The Canadian mining giant also insisted on a further $20 million guarantee, which was readily granted by a relieved provincial government. 124 Irving was incensed by the Noranda takeover and tried to convince Boylen and Patino representatives to let him bail Brunswick out personally. But the directors, who had been warned by Byrne that future government aid depended on the consummation of the Noranda deal, refused to consider his offer. At a tense shareholders' meeting in June 1967 to authorize Noranda's takeover, Irving complained that Boylen was pressured to delay his offer -which he claimed was $63 million compared to Noranda's $so million -being presented to the board of directors until Noranda's had been accepted. He also blamed Brunswick's financial problems on the premier, who had refused to allow construction delays. 'I realised the danger of going ahead without the money. The premier said "no -go ahead."' Despite Irving's protests, Noranda's offer was accepted by the company. The central Canadian mining firm controlled eight of the fifteen seats on the board of directors and took over management of the project from Irving, now relegated to the status of minority shareholder. 12 5 Noranda's takeover left Irving very bitter and, over the next few years, he became a very large thorn in Brunswick's side. At the time of the takeover, Brunswick's aceounts payable amounted to more than $19 million, of which nearly $15 million was owed to Irving companies. Irving, who along with his son Arthur remained on Brunswick's board of directors, wanted immediate payment, but Noranda's managers wanted to verify the expenses. Irving was reluctant to allow this audit and, in October 1967, filed thirty-one different legal actions against Brunswick in order to collect the money owed. Table l lists the companies making claims against Brunswick and its subsidiaries and shows just how completely the Irving group monopolized construction of the industrial complex. The issue remained unresolved for a number of years and was the source of considerable friction at annual shareholders' meetings during the 1967-70 period. Each meeting would see Irving and his representatives reiterate their version of the takeover and then pepper Noranda's managers and government-appointed directors with demands for repayment and accusations of mismanagement. For their part, the directors, led by Brunswick's new president, W.S. Row, would assert their company's managerial and technical expertise, hint at the Irving group's responsibility for Brunswick's cost overruns, and assure shareholders that all outstanding accounts would be repaid just as soon as they were verified. 126 Tensions between Irving and the government were exacerbated in 1969 when the ubiquitous Edward Byrne convinced the Robichaud cabinet to amend a section of the province's Companies Act mandating minority representation on boards of directors. Acting as lawyer for an unnamed out-of-province mining interest, Byrne argued that the provision was obsolete, since minority shareholders were protected by stringent federal corporate laws. Irving, whose minority shareholder status on Brunswick's board of directors was an irritant to both the province and Noranda, believed he was the target. He opposed successfully the amendment in an appearance before the Law Amendments Committee, where he wondered aloud just who was Byrne's mysterious client. Byrne and Row both denied that Noranda was behind the action -a claim that seems borne out by Byrne's personal correspondencebut the lawyer's close relationship with Robichaud, his role in the Noranda takeover, and his position as a Brunswick director made Irving's conspiracy theories understandable. 12 7
The wildest of Brunswick's annual meetings occurred in 1969, when Irving arrived with a number of union representatives from his various business enterprises who had been 'given voting shares in Brunswick, the day off, and a paid trip to Bathurst from Saint John.' 128 This .'Rent a Crowd' challenged Brunswick's directors throughout the meeting, criticizing them for not paying their bills to the Irving Under Noranda's management the Belledune industrial complex was brought into production, but on a less grand scale than had been previously planned and with mixed results. Noranda permanently shelved the Bay Steel project and decided not to proceed with the construction of Belledune harbour, choosing instead to ship all their products out of Dalhousie. The fertilizer plant, Belledune Fertilizer Limited, came into production in 1968, but experienced difficulty finding buyers for its product. Moreover, Brunswick's smelter, which came into production in 1967, was plagued with production and environmental problems and did not reach maximum operating capacity until 1970-r. ' 32 By 1970 New Brunswick's mineral industry could best be described as a qualified success. Brunswick's operations and those of a handful of smaller mines contributed to a significant growth in both the output and value of the province's mining industry, from 16 million tons worth just over $3 million in 1962 to 500 million tons worth nearly $90 million in 1970. This growth is also reflected in the creation of a significant number of steady industrial jobs. In addition to the 1500 workers employed annually in constructing the smelter complex during the 1964-7 period, another 2500 to 2900 found employment in the mining industry after the smelter came into production.' 33 Despite this impressive growth, however, . there were few indications that the industry was having the transformative effect on the provincial and local economies predicted by state planners. Unemployment rates in northeastern New Brunswick remained significantly higher than those elsewhere in the province and in Canada, while the region's per capita income was just over half the national average.' 34 The region's poor economic performance undermined the Northeast Plan's social development agenda of training, educating, and modernizing the local workforce for industrial jobs created by private investment. A review of the plan in 1970 attributed the shortfall in economic opportunities to the fact · that the mining industry produced 'virtually no secondary investments associated with the development' and 'little impact on the service sector. ' The Liberal administration of Louis Robichaud was both more able and willing to use the state to direct the development plans of private mining capital than was its Progressive Conservative predecessor. Factors such as the development of non-American markets for base metals, a growing provincial bureaucracy with the technical expertise to analyse industry proposals, and an ideological climate less hostile to state intervention all increased the 'capacity' of the provincial state to intervene during the 196os. 136 Moreover, the provincial Liberals were themselves more disposed ideologically to using the · state to meet economic and social objectives, as they did with the Equal Opportunity initiatives. But this willingness to intervene against powerful economic interests was also shaped by longstanding and widespread discontent with corporate resource exploitation in northern New Brunswick, much of it expressed through traditional clientelist networks. Mindful of these factors as well as the region's history of voting Liberal. the populist Robichaud was willing to use the province's powers to ensure the location of a base metal smelter in northern New Brunswick.
Although the Liberal government's attempt to use local capital to develop the base metal industry suggests a departure from the traditional reliance of Maritime provincial governments on foreign capital for natural resource development,13 7 it must be noted that the Robichaud administration was in no way committed to a 'local' development strategy. In other economic sectors, most notably the forest industries, the Liberal government actively courted outside capital; indeed, throughout the 1963 election campaign, Robichaud boasted of his government's plans to attract outside capital to the province. The base metal example, then, is an exception to the broad thrust of the Liberal government's development strategy. Furthermore, it is exceptional only to a point, for the province's reliance on domestic investment in the mining industry was limited to one large interest that it eventually forced out in favour of another outside developer.' 38 The Robichaud government did not perceive itself to be as dependent on individual corporations as did its predecessors, but it did view foreign investment as an integral part of the province's economic redevelopment.
Although the province's role in encouraging St Joseph Lead to leave the New Brunswick minefields was motivated by equal measures of pragmatism and populism, the government did believe initially that the general interest in mineral development was better served under a domestic investor. Over the next decade it became clear that in escaping dependence on foreign capital, the province entered a new and perhaps more dependent relationship with its leading industrialist. K.C. Irving understood both the strategic importance of mineral development to state-sponsored modernization plans and the popular legitimacy he gained from his local roots, and and he exploited these advantages to win extensive concessions from all levels of government. Provincial politicians found it difficult to deny Irving's requests for increasing levels of government aid when he, a native New Brunswicker, was developing mineral deposits left dormant by an American multinational. Even when local opposition mounted against his management of smelter construction, Irving retained a legitimacy in the resource development field that outside corporations could not match. In this way, then, the province's decision to orchestrate Noranda's takeover of Brunswick fr<?m Irving was much more difficult than its actions against St Joseph Lead earlier in the decade.' 39 While both these 138 New. Brunswick's approach was thus very unlike domestic mineral development strategies during the 1960s and 1970s in Alberta, where the state tried to encourage the creation of a new domestic investor class, and in Saskatchewan, where the province nationalized the potash industry. See Richards, Prairie Capitalism. 139 Peter Evans has argued that states have increased bargaining power with multinationals operating in natural resource sectors precisely because the corporations recognize that they lack popular legitimacy. Moreover, when these multinationals fail to meet the host country's development goals -particularly domestic processing of natural resources -the state is given 'critical ammunition' to act against the foreign investors. See Evans, 
